A cost segregation study is an engineering-based analysis that reclassifies parts of a building purchase into shorter recovery periods. It does not create a deduction that did not exist. It moves deductions forward, which matters because a dollar deducted against a high marginal rate today is worth more than the same dollar spread across three decades. This is where it stood in 2022, which was the year cheap money ended and the phase-down clock started.
What 2022 changed
2022 split into two halves. The first looked like 2021: strong demand, rising rates, aggressive competition for inventory. The second was defined by the fastest rise in borrowing costs in decades, which changed what a property had to earn to work.
Revenue held up better than most expected while the cost of capital rose underneath it. Deals underwritten in the spring frequently did not pencil by the autumn on the same purchase price.
2022 was the final year of 100% bonus depreciation under the TCJA schedule before the step-down to 80% in 2023.
How it works
A cost segregation study is an engineering-based analysis that reclassifies parts of a building purchase into shorter recovery periods. It does not create a deduction that did not exist. It moves deductions forward, which matters because a dollar deducted against a high marginal rate today is worth more than the same dollar spread across three decades.
- An engineer or qualified specialist inspects the property and the closing documents and allocates the purchase price across component classes.
- Carpet, appliances, decorative fixtures, specialty electrical and furnishings typically fall into 5 or 7-year property.
- Driveways, walkways, landscaping, fencing, site utilities and pools typically fall into 15-year land improvements.
- The reclassified components then become eligible for bonus depreciation at the rate in force for the placed-in-service year.
What that meant in 2022 specifically
2022 was the last year at 100% bonus depreciation, which pulled some purchases forward into December as buyers tried to place property in service before the step-down.
Supply caught up in several markets during 2022. The properties that struggled were the ones bought at 2021 prices on the assumption that 2021 occupancy would persist.
The discipline that mattered in 2022 was stress testing against a higher rate and a normalised occupancy at the same time, rather than one or the other.
This is an explanation of how the rules worked, not tax advice. My BnB Accelerator, LLC is a real estate acquisition firm, not a CPA firm. Our independent partner firm is AE Tax Advisors.
Where it goes wrong
The failure modes are consistent across years, which is itself useful information: they are not caused by the market cycle, so a different year does not protect you from them.
- Doing the study on a property that does not clear the seven-day test, which leaves the accelerated loss passive and largely stranded.
- Planning a short hold. Recapture on sale returns much of what the study deferred, so the strategy rewards a long hold or an exit structured as a 1031 exchange.
- Commissioning the study so late that the report does not exist before the filing deadline.
What a buyer should have done in 2022
The discipline that mattered in 2022 was stress testing against a higher rate and a normalised occupancy at the same time, rather than one or the other.
The underwriting discipline does not change with the year. Twelve individual monthly revenue figures from a comparable set you assembled, a complete expense stack including reserves, and a stress test at 75% of projection that still covers debt service.
We screen roughly a thousand deals a week and eliminate about 98% of them. That ratio has held across every year on this site, through the boom, the correction and the stabilisation, because it is a function of how listings are selected rather than of the market.
What generalises, and what does not
Reading a year in isolation is the most common analytical error in this business. 2022 had its own conditions, and someone who learned the wrong lesson from it carried that lesson into a market that no longer rewarded it.
What generalises is the mechanics above. The definitions, the tests, the sequence and the failure modes are the same in every year on this site, which is why they are worth learning properly once rather than relearning each cycle.
What does not generalise is the environment: the cost of capital, the depth of supply, the bonus depreciation percentage, and the regulatory posture of a given jurisdiction. Those change, sometimes abruptly, and a model that treats them as fixed is a model that was only ever right about one year.
The practical consequence is to build the analysis so the environment is an input rather than an assumption. A property that only works at one interest rate, one occupancy level and one tax treatment is not an investment thesis, it is a bet that nothing moves.
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Frequently asked questions
What was different about cost segregation on a short-term rental in 2022?
2022 split into two halves. The first looked like 2021: strong demand, rising rates, aggressive competition for inventory. The second was defined by the fastest rise in borrowing costs in decades, which changed what a property had to earn to work.
What was the main risk in 2022?
Supply caught up in several markets during 2022. The properties that struggled were the ones bought at 2021 prices on the assumption that 2021 occupancy would persist.
What was bonus depreciation in 2022?
2022 was the final year of 100% bonus depreciation under the TCJA schedule before the step-down to 80% in 2023.